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AbsTrACT
In this paper, we argue that lesbian couples who wish to 
have children who are genetically related to both of them 
should be allowed access to mitochondrial replacement 
techniques (MRTs). First, we provide a brief explanation 
of mitochondrial diseases and MRTs. We then present 
the reasons why MRTs are not, by nature, therapeutic. 
The upshot of the view that MRTs are non-therapeutic 
techniques is that their therapeutic potential cannot 
be invoked for restricting their use only to those cases 
where a mitochondrial DNA disease could be ’cured’. We 
then argue that a positive case for MRTs is justified by 
an appeal to reproductive freedom, and that the criteria 
to access these techniques should hence be extended 
to include lesbian couples who wish to share genetic 
parenthood. Finally, we consider a potential objection to 
our argument: that the desire to have genetically related 
kin is not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian 
couples to access MRTs.
InTroduCTIon
One of the main purposes of bioethics is to 
demarcate morally acceptable applications of 
biomedical technologies. For example, in the past 
decade, there has been much debate in bioethics 
on whether there is a morally significant differ-
ence between therapeutic and enhancing genetic 
modifying interventions. ‘Bioconservatives’ such as 
Michael Sandel and Jürgen Habermas maintain that 
biotechnological practices aimed at curing disease 
are morally acceptable, whereas those aimed at 
increasing certain traits such as height and strength 
are morally suspicious.1 2 Other moral boundaries 
investigated by bioethicists concern morally appro-
priate versus inappropriate uses of reproductive 
screening technologies—such as preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD)—and of reprogenetics 
technologies—of which mitochondrial replacement 
techniques (MRTs)i are an example. The latter tech-
niques help women wishing to become mothers 
who carry mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) abnor-
malities in their eggs to have genetically related 
offspring free from mtDNA diseases.3 
MRTs have been at the forefront of bioethical 
debate since the UK began to discuss their legali-
sation in the 2000s. In February 2015, regula-
tions were passed on two MRTs: maternal spindle 
transfer (MST) and pronuclear transfer (PNT). 
i Even though the name ‘mitochondrial replacement 
techniques’ is contested, here we use it because it has 
secured a foothold within the academic debate; see Pala-
cios-González’s Mitochondrial replacement techniques: egg 
donation, genealogy and eugenics.62 Ainsley Newson and 
Anthony Wrigley have recently proposed and defended 
the term ‘mitochondrial targeting techniques’.63
These regulations came into force in October 2015, 
making the UK the first country in the world to 
explicitly legalise MRTs under a licensed scheme.4ii
Although these technologies are legal in the UK, 
at the present time, only people at risk of transmit-
ting a severe mtDNA disease can access them. The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochon-
drial Donation) Regulations 2015 state that the 
permitted circumstances for using these techniques 
are when:
1. There is a particular risk that any egg extracted 
from the ovaries of a woman named in the 
determination—or embryo which is created 
by the fertilisation of an egg extracted 
from the ovaries of a woman named in the 
determination—may have mitochondrial 
abnormalities caused by mtDNA.
2. There is a significant risk that a person with 
those abnormalities will have or develop serious 
mitochondrial disease.4
Part of the rationale for these regulations is to 
allow couples at risk of transmitting mtDNA diseases 
to have children who are free from them.5 In addi-
tion, MRTs may aid lesbian couples, and couples 
where both members have functional ovaries (ie, 
couples or relationships where one member may be 
intersex or transgender) to have genetically related 
children.iii It has also been theorised that they can 
be used to increase the chances of avoiding embry-
onic arrest and thus allow couples whose infertility is 
not related to mtDNA mutations to have genetically 
related children too, but this possibility awaits empir-
ical demonstration.iv These two potential applications 
of MRTs are not at present legal in UK. However, it 
must be said that it seems that the MRTs regulations 
were not written down with the explicit intention of 
singling out these possibilities as illegal but rather in 
the attempt to make MRTs legal in order to avoid 
mtDNA diseases.5
Legal scholars, bioethicists and stakeholders partic-
ipating in the debate on MRTs have tried to establish 
a morally significant boundary between acceptable 
and unacceptable applications of these techniques. 
ii Interestingly, the first couple of babies born because 
of MRTs were not born in UK, but in USA (by means 
of maternal spindle transfer) and Ukraine (by means of 
pronuclear transfer).64 65
iii Even when in this paper we mainly refer to lesbian 
couples our arguments equally apply to all couples where 
both members have functional ovaries or cryopreserved 
eggs.
iv Due to space constraints, we do not investigate, or focus 
on, the ethical aspects of offering MRTs to heterosexual 
couples with non-mtDNA-related infertility problems. We 
also do not discuss other ethical issues related to MRTs 
more generally, such as risks to egg providers.
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For example, the mitochondrial disease community (patients, 
researchers and clinicians) have strongly advocated for a thera-
peutic (ie, acceptable) and a non-therapeutic (ie, unacceptable) 
demarcation of MRTs. By doing so they aim, in part, to avoid 
challenges from slippery-slope type arguments that allowing MRTs 
would then lead to ‘designer babies’.
In this paper, we argue that lesbian couples who want to have 
children who are genetically related to both of them should be 
allowed access to MRTs. The paper is structured as follows. 
First, we provide a brief explanation of mitochondrial diseases 
and MRTs. Second, we show that MRTs are not therapeutic in 
nature and thus this feature of the techniques cannot be invoked 
for restricting their use only to those cases where an mtDNA 
disease could be ‘cured’. We then argue that a positive case for 
MRTs is justified by an appeal to reproductive freedom and that 
access to these techniques should hence be extended to lesbian 
couples. Finally, we consider a potential objection to our argu-
ment: namely that the desire to have genetically related kin is 
not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian couples to access 
MRTs.
MIToChondrIAl dIsEAsEs And MrTs
Mitochondria have been described as the ‘powerhouses’ of our 
cells. They are small structures whose main known purpose is to 
produce the necessary energy for cellular, organ and bodily func-
tion.6 They are inherited via the maternal line and have their own 
DNA (mtDNA), which resides outside the cell’ s nucleus. Mito-
chondrial diseases are a cluster of neuromuscular diseases in which 
symptoms vary in severity and expression and can develop imme-
diately after birth or later in life.7 8 Mutations both in the nuclear 
DNA and the mtDNA can cause mitochondrial diseases. Delete-
rious mutations in the mtDNA, in each cell, can happen across all 
mitochondria (this is known as homoplasmy) or they can occur 
only in certain mitochondria (known as heteroplasmy). In this 
paper, we will only discuss mitochondrial diseases produced by 
problems in the mtDNA, referred to as mtDNA diseases.
To avoid the transmission of an mtDNA disease, two MRTs 
have been developed: PNT and MST. PNT requires the creation 
of two zygotes, through assisted reproductive techniques (ARTs), 
one with the gametes of the intending parents (or intending mother 
and a sperm donor) and the other one with a donated egg and 
the intending father’s (or donor’s) sperm. In this scenario, the first 
zygote has faulty mitochondria and the second has healthy mito-
chondria. On the first day after fertilisation, the maternal and 
paternal pronuclei are removed from both zygotes. The enucleated 
cell produced with the intending mother’s egg and the pronuclei 
which were housed in the cell produced with the donor’s egg are 
discarded. Afterwards, the intending parents’ (or intending moth-
er’s and donor’s) pronuclei are ferried into the enucleated cell 
produced with the donor’s egg. The reconstructed zygote, which 
possesses healthy mitochondria, can be subsequently transferred to 
the intending mother or a surrogate.9
In MST, eggs are obtained through ARTs from an intending 
mother and a healthy donor. The nuclear material from the 
intending mother’s egg and the donor’s egg is extracted. The 
donor’s nuclear material and the intending mother’s enucleated 
egg are discarded, and the intending mother’s nuclear material 
is ferried into the now enucleated donor’s egg.v Subsequently, 
v Both for PNT and MST, if during the chromosomal transfer there is a 
large unintentional carryover of pathological mitochondria the mtDNA 
disease could manifest immediately afterwards and in subsequent gener-
ations.66 67
the reconstructed egg is fertilised in vitro and then transferred 
to the intending mother or a surrogate.6 One of the aims of both 
techniques is for the donor’s healthy mitochondria to help in the 
development of a healthy child and to be passed down via the 
maternal line to subsequent generations.
At present, approximately 30 mtDNA haplogroups in 
humans have been described.10 The fact that there are so many 
groups is important for our discussion, as there is an ongoing 
debate regarding mito-nuclear interactions after MRTs. Some, 
for example Edward Morrow, argue that if the mitochondrial 
haplogroup of the egg donor is not matched to that of the 
intending mother this could give rise to mito-nuclear incom-
patibility, translating into adverse health effects for the future 
offspring.11 The last report commissioned by the Human Fertil-
isation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) concerning MRTs 
being ready for clinical practice asserted that:
The panel continues to recommend that consideration is given 
to mtDNA haplogroup matching as a precautionary step in the 
process of selecting donors (…) At present, the panel believes any 
risks associated with a mtDNA-nuclear DNA mismatch remain 
theoretical; the recent studies examining embryonic cells and 
stem cells generated from MST-derived  and PNT-derived human 
embryos reported no evidence of any complications or compromise 
of mitochondrial function arising from unmatched mtDNA 
haplogroups.12
Prior to the advent of MRTs, women at risk of transmitting 
an mtDNA disease who knew about their condition had the 
following options: first, refraining from having children; second, 
turning to adoption, embryo adoption or gamete donation; 
third, seeking to have genetically related children after under-
going oocyte sampling to assess the risk of recurrence (an option 
normally available to couples who have already had an affected 
child) or chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis (and then 
deciding for or against termination) or by using PGD. It must be 
noted that while adoption, embryo adoption and gamete dona-
tion guarantee that future children will not be affected by an 
mtDNA disease, PGD and the other techniques do not always 
guarantee similar results.13 For example, PGD is not effective 
when the mutations are novel or uncommon, and thus there are 
not enough reference clinical data available to guide the couple’s 
decision.13
Different reproductive options are currently available for 
lesbian couples.14 Some of them, such as adoption, embryo adop-
tion and gamete donation, entail either refraining from having 
genetically related children (adoption and embryo adoption) or 
having children that are genetically related to only one of the 
couple (third-party reproduction). Recently, another possibility, 
ROPA (reception of oocytes from partner), has gained some visi-
bility.15 16 ROPA allows lesbian couples to have a child who is 
genetically related to one mother (ie, the mother who provides 
the oocytes which are subsequently fertilised with donor sperm) 
and who is gestationally related to the other mother. These 
options do not allow lesbian couples to have children who are 
genetically related to both of them.vi MRTs, on other hand, would 
vi Even when it is true that there are epigenetic influences during preg-
nancy and that the gestating mother could be thought to have genetic ties 
to the child she bears, here we are using ‘genetic’ in a more narrow sense. 
We understand ‘genes’ as physical tokens of transmission that originate 
in the parent and that could be said to materially overlap between parent 
and child. We appreciate that there are many and important philosoph-
ical questions regarding the role of epigenetic influence in parenthood, 
but they are beyond the scope of this paper. We are indebted to one of 
the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out to us.
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allow both women in a lesbian couple to share a genetic link 
with their offspring. Specifically, one of them would contribute 
with nuclear DNA and the other with mtDNA. Finally, it is 
important to mention that worldwide reproductive options for 
lesbian couples (and homosexual couples more generally) are 
often directly or indirectly limited by laws and regulations which 
restrict access to adoption and third-party reproduction.
ArE MrTs ThErApEuTIC In nATurE?
Debates on the ethics of reprogenetics technologies stir contro-
versies as they touch on values and beliefs on the meaning of 
parenthood, the moral status of early human life and our obli-
gations to future generations. In particular, debates on the ethics 
of introducing a new reproductive technology are characterised 
by reflections on the welfare of children born due to that tech-
nology. They are centred on the necessity of balancing uncer-
tainties regarding the possible benefits and risks of such new 
technology and on the extent to which the reproductive freedom 
of prospective parents ought to be respected.17 Even though 
competing moral views generate diverging assessments of the 
importance that should be granted to the values and beliefs at 
stake, concerns related to the welfare of future children are often 
considered more important than the reproductive freedom of 
prospective parents. This is so as preventing a child (although a 
future one) from suffering harm is considered a morally appro-
priate reason to restrict prospective parents’ freedom.
Unsurprisingly, the debate on MRTs is no exception and 
welfare of the child considerations has been at the forefront of 
the ethical debate concerning these techniques. Interestingly, the 
welfare of children born due to MRTs has been employed both 
as a critique of these techniques and as an argument in favour of 
them. For instance, those who use the welfare of the future child 
to oppose MRTs maintain that these techniques are too risky 
for the health of future children, that their safety has not been 
thoroughly assessed, and that there may be unforeseen negative 
effects for the children conceived due to MRTs and for these 
children’s children.18–23 For example, Françoise Baylis asserts 
that:
Mitochondrial replacement technology is experimental and there 
is very limited information about safety and efficacy. As with any 
germline intervention, there are significant and legitimate concerns 
about the health and well-being of future children and the potential 
short-term and long-term harms to them and their progeny.18
According to this view, a concern for the welfare of future 
children (and those children’s children) warrants banning or 
heavily restricting MRTs until all the above-mentioned worries 
have been dispelled. Interestingly, many of those in favour of the 
techniques have also appealed to welfare of the child consider-
ations and maintain that it is such concerns which should moti-
vate their approval, although their take on the present safety 
of the techniques is radically different.24–27 According to such 
commentators, the severity of certain mtDNA conditions and 
their disabling and life-limiting character are sufficient reasons 
to allow for the clinical use of MRTs. For example, Arthur 
Caplan argues that an MRT procedure ‘is not without its risks, 
but it’s treating a disease’.28 And that ‘[t]hese little embryos, 
these are people born with a disease, they can’t make power. 
You’re giving them a new battery. That’s a therapy’.28 Framed in 
this way, it is clear that MRTs can be regarded as a therapy for 
mtDNA diseases.
The argument in favour of MRTs based on their ‘therapeutic’ 
nature is a powerful one: who would dare object to the approval 
of safe techniques that spare children from suffering? This 
argument runs something like this: we are morally required to 
prevent the suffering and premature death of innocent individ-
uals. MRTs can prevent the suffering and premature death of 
existing innocent individuals. Hence, we are morally required to 
carry out MRTs.
The framing of MRTs in terms of a therapy for mtDNA 
diseases for existing individuals (in contrast with future ones) 
allows supporters of these techniques to build a moral case in 
favour of their approval and, at the same time, to raise a suppos-
edly justified moral boundary. The moral line is drawn between 
uses that are therapeutic, and hence good, and uses that are 
‘beyond therapy’, and hence morally suspicious. In order to 
make our case that lesbian couples should have access to MRTs 
to have genetically related children, we first challenge their 
alleged therapeutic nature. Doing so allows us to show that the 
therapeutic/non-therapeutic moral boundary does not exist and 
thus that criteria of access to MRTs must be grounded on other 
considerations.
Thus far, Wrigley et al27 have carried out the most thorough 
defence of the therapeutic nature of MRTs (or at least of one of 
the two techniques). The authors maintain that ‘PNT […] is a 
form of therapy based on embryo modification while MST is, 
instead, an instance of selective reproduction’.27 They draw this 
conclusion from the observation that the process of PNT (which 
entails enucleation, transfer and reconstitution) does not affect 
the numerical identity of the embryo as it already exists. PNT 
pre-emptively cures an already existing being. Conversely, at 
the point of the process of MST (which also entails enucleation, 
transfer and reconstitution), it is unknown (in almost all cases) 
which sperm cell will fertilise the reconstituted oocyte, and thus 
the identity of the future individual has not been determined 
(supposing that our numerical identity is determined by specific 
gametes which fuse). On this basis, Wrigley et al conclude that 
MST cannot cure anyone while PNT does. The upshot of their 
argument is that there ‘is a strong prima facie harm-avoidance 
rationale for offering PNT to prospective parents and for those 
parents to accept it; one that is not present in the case of MST 
[emphasis added]’.27
Wrigley et al’s stance has been criticised for a number 
of reasons.29 30 One point of contention is that there is no 
harm-avoidance rationale for offering PNT to prospective 
parents, as at the point of offering it there is no one who could be 
subject to PNT and thus no one who could be cured. When the 
clinical decision to employ PNT is made, it affects which sperm 
and egg will fuse, which means that: ‘the gametes that will fuse 
in order for the process of PNT to happen would most certainly 
not have fused in the first place if PNT had not been chosen as 
the course of action’.29 This is the case because after the deci-
sion to carry out PNT has been made, the woman will have to 
be subject to hormonal stimulation and to the egg extraction 
process. This means that the egg that would have been fertilised 
the month that she/the couple decided to undergo PNT is not 
the same egg as that which will be fertilised prior to undergoing 
the PNT procedure. And even in the rare case of having only 
one single cryopreserved egg, the sperm cell that will fertilise 
the egg will depend on when the sperm sample is provided or 
which sperm from an already collected sample is actively chosen 
or which sperm happens to fertilise the egg in vitro from an 
already collected sample. All this shows that the clinical decision 
to employ PNT affects the timing of conception and thus who 
will exist.
Additionally, Matthew Liao has argued from an Organism 
View account that the process of MST and PNT is numerically 
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identity-affecting.31 According to Liao, the enucleation, transfer 
and reconstitution actions are of such nature that both eggs, 
or both embryos, cease to exist and a third egg, or embryo, is 
created. In order to understand Liao’s argument, we must bear 
in mind that an egg, or embryo, is an organism. An organism, 
as a kind of thing: (1) begins to exist when the capacity to 
regulate and coordinate the various life processes (respiration, 
absorption, metabolism and so on) is there; (2) it persists as 
long as there is a continuing ability to regulate and coordinate 
the various life processes and (3) it ceases to exist when the 
capacity to regulate and coordinate the various life processes 
is permanently gone.31 The two main reasons why the enucle-
ation process permanently disrupts the organismic continuity 
processes of the eggs, or zygotes, are: first, that the cytoplasm 
of an egg, or zygote, contains crucial components for regulating 
and coordinating the various life processes; second, that there 
are life processes in the cytoplasm of an egg, or zygote, that the 
nucleus does not control (fully, at least).31 What this means is 
that an egg’s capacity to regulate its metabolism, for example, is 
destroyed when we enucleate it, and thus a new capacity comes 
into being when we transfer the intending mother’s maternal 
spindle into the donor’s enucleated egg. This metaphysical 
stance is relevant when morally assessing MRTs, as it follows 
from it that ‘in essence’ neither technique is therapeutic. They 
are not therapeutic because they do not cure anyone; they just 
bring into existence a new organism.
Furthermore, by maintaining that numerical identity follows 
the nuclear DNA, Wrigley et al appear to endorse the view that 
cells are essentially their nuclear genes (or a collection of them). 
But if genes are what establish numerical identity, then why is 
the mtDNA not part of what constitutes the numerical identity 
of a cell, as it also contains genes? Why consider only the nuclear 
genome and not that plus the mitochondrial one? And equally, 
why is it the case that all the chromosomes establish numerical 
identity and not only a subset of them? Wrigley et al’s view does 
not offer a compelling case of the notion that cells are essentially 
their nuclear genomes.
According to the previous arguments neither MST nor PNT 
are therapeutic and hence a moral case for them and, more 
importantly, for restricting their use cannot be based on how 
the welfare of a particular child will be improved. These consid-
erations have two implications: on the one hand, it is necessary 
to abandon the rhetoric of cure and therapy and on the other 
that additional reasons should be presented to ground the moral 
case in favour of MRTs. Let us now consider another argument 
that could justify the moral acceptability of MRTs: reproductive 
freedom.
rEproduCTIvE frEEdoM And MrTs
Those who have advocated the legalisation of MRTs in UK have 
frequently appealed to the importance of allowing couples at 
risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease, the freedom to choose 
to procreate according to their preferred life plan: what is 
commonly referred to as reproductive freedom or procreative 
liberty.vii32–35 They argue that couples should be free to choose 
whether to have genetically related healthy children and that 
third parties—be them the state, religious institutions or fellow 
citizens—should not interfere with their choices. For example, 
Andrew Miller, the chair of UK’s Commons Science and 
vii Here we do not distinguish between the different expressions used to 
refer to reproductive freedom (ie, reproductive autonomy and procre-
ative liberty).
Technology Committee from 2010 to 2015, argued against the 
lobbying efforts by religious groups to reject MRTs: ‘It is utterly 
outrageous in a free society for the churches to tell parents who 
are in this painfully difficult position that they cannot undergo 
procedures like this’.36 Why was Miller angered by the churches’ 
interference in procreative decisions? In this section, we first try 
to make sense of Miller’s (and other defenders of reproductive 
freedom) outrage, and we then show that if MRTs fall within 
the remit of the reproductive freedom of heterosexual couples 
where women are at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease, then 
they also fall within the remit of the reproductive freedom of 
lesbian couples.
In contemporary Western democratic societies, freedom of 
choice is defended from third parties’ interference on political 
and moral grounds. This has its roots in the work of John Stuart 
Mill and other liberal philosophers. Mill believed that the only 
appropriate moral ground for interference in one’s actions is if 
one’s free agency may cause harm to others.32 37 In On Liberty, 
he asserts that there should only be ‘one very simple principle, 
as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the 
individual in the way of compulsion and control’. The principle 
states that:
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant.37
The former is commonly known as Mill’s ‘Harm Principle’, a 
principle that sits at the core of our liberal democratic societies, 
where, ‘the presumption in favour of the freedom of citizens to 
make their own choices without interference places the burden 
of proof on attempts to limit freedom’.38 Isaiah Berlin labelled 
this Millian understanding of freedom as negative freedom or 
freedom from.39 Elements of this negative understanding of 
freedom survive in defences of the moral right of people to 
make ‘autonomous choices in matters of procreation’40 or, as 
John Robertson puts it: ‘the freedom to reproduce or not to 
reproduce in the genetic sense’.33 John Harris, John Robertson, 
Dan Brock and other contemporary advocates of reproductive 
freedom strongly emphasise the importance of defending the 
freedom of people to make significant choices in matters of 
procreation without third parties’ interference. They also main-
tain that this procreative freedom ought to be limited only if it 
becomes incompatible with a like liberty for all or if it may cause 
significant harm to others. Harris’ and Robertson’s theorising of 
reproductive freedom only in negative terms has been criticised 
most notably by Catherine Mills, who argues that reproductive 
freedom also contains positive elements and who understands 
it as a ‘practice of self-making’, one that allow prospective 
parents to ‘give shape’ to their lives.38 In this sense, reproduc-
tive freedom incorporates the negative elements of the Millian 
liberal tradition and some of the positive elements that Berlin 
also identified, those that allow for self-determination and that 
make our actions the product of our own agency.39
But why does reproductive freedom matter? Why is it a constant 
reference and point of contention in debates on assisted repro-
duction? Different authors have provided (slightly) different 
accounts of why reproductive freedom ought to be treated as 
a fundamental moral good, but at the core of all these accounts 
are two moral bases for its defence: the centrality of reproduc-
tion for the development of personal life plans (the autonomy 
argument for reproductive freedom) and for the well-being of 
individuals (the welfarist argument for reproductive freedom). 
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The autonomy argument grounding reproductive freedom refers 
to the morally relevant interest of individuals shaping their own 
lives according to the values or interests which are relevant to 
them.41 42 Reproductive freedom is thus important not in itself 
but due to ‘the values or interests or standing that this particular 
constraint defeats’.41 Applied to the MRTs debate, the autonomy 
argument provides a sound moral defence of the right of couples 
at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease to their children to 
reproduce as they want and to have healthy children that are 
genetically related to them. The welfarist argument, on the other 
hand, focuses on the relevance of reproductive decisions for 
individuals’ well-being and understands reproduction as a ‘core 
human activity’33 or ‘fundamental right’.43 Failing to respect 
reproductive freedom and placing constraints on its exercise 
may negatively impact individuals’ well-being and their ability 
to lead a good life.35 It is for these reasons that reproductive 
freedom should not be interfered with for trivial reasons and 
that placing limits on reproductive freedom is morally accept-
able only for significant reasons, such as the occurrence of signif-
icant harm to others.viii
When we take into consideration our previous discussion on 
the ‘therapeutic’ nature of MRTs, we realise that Mill’s ‘harm 
principle’ does not relate to a consideration of the created child. 
What we are maintaining here is that under a personal account 
of morality and a counterfactual account of harm—‘if your act 
harms someone, then it makes that person worse off than they 
would have been had you not done the act’44—neither PNT nor 
MST leave created children worse off than they would other-
wise have been. Such children are not made worse off by MRTs 
because the only other available ‘option’ for them is not to exist.ix
Our premise that MRTs do not inflict harm to future chil-
dren leads to the conclusion that these technologies fall, under 
a Millian understanding of freedom, within the proper remit 
of the reproductive freedom of women with mtDNA diseases. 
Given the moral importance of reproductive freedom for 
people’s capacity to be autonomous and for their well-being, 
we can further argue that the current UK legislation  on MRTs 
benefits women at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease (and 
their partners). It benefits them as these techniques represent an 
additional reproductive option, one that allows them to have 
healthy genetically related children (if they wish to do so).x Then 
viii For a discussion of the limits of reproductive freedom and of limits 
other than significant harm to others, see Dan Brock and Allen Buchanan 
et al, chapter six in particular.32 35
ix Two things must be clear: first, that the only case where someone 
could be harmed here is if their life is a wrongful one; second, that this 
is a classic instance of the Non-identity Problem. Expanding on the 
Non-identity Problem would require more space than is available here. 
For a compelling case of why children are not harmed, see David Boon-
in’s work on this issue.44 68
x The idea that more choices lead to greater freedom and well-being has 
been challenged notably in the work of Gerald Dworkin, Nikolas Rose 
and Barbara Katz Rothman.69–71 They have argued that more options 
can also have the effect of bringing about more perceived and actual 
responsibilities. Recently, one of us has further elaborated this view in 
the context of genome editing and assisted reproduction.17 In the case of 
MRTs and couples at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease, however, 
the range of (reproductive) options currently available includes either 
refraining from having offspring who are genetically related to both 
prospective parents or risking passing on the mtDNA disease. MRTs 
would allow the additional option of having healthy children who are 
genetically related to both prospective parents. Similarly, as shown 
above, the (reproductive) options currently available to lesbian couples 
do not allow them to enjoy genetic kinship. For these reasons, MRTs 
could not be said to count as a mere quantitative addition to the range of 
options currently available to prospective parents,  but as a qualitatively 
again, (explicitly) legislating against MRTs would violate these 
women’s reproductive freedom by restricting their significant 
range of reproductive options and the possibility of enjoying 
genetic parenthood. The upshot of considering that the moral 
case in favour of these technologies is that they add a significant 
reproductive option to prospective parents is that the ethical 
focus shifts from mainly taking into account questions of the 
safety and welfare of future children to considering how these 
technologies have the potential to benefit prospective mothers 
and couples.
At this point, we have reached the crux of the issue: namely, 
the moral reasons for making MRTs available to women at risk 
of transmitting an mtDNA disease, ceteris paribus, also ground 
their access to lesbian couples as: (1) people have a great interest 
in reproduction because of how it shapes their lives according 
to the values and interests which are relevant to them, and it 
is also a very deep personal and private project which has a 
significant impact on individuals’ well-being and (2) the fact that 
MRTs cannot be said to harm any child created through their 
use. Finally, the fact that lesbian couples need a sperm donor, in 
addition to their own eggs, does not detract from our stance. It 
does not do so as sperm donation for family-making purposes is 
morally acceptable.45
At this point, it would be possible to counter that mitochon-
dria only produce energy and only represent 1% of the total 
amount of genetic material, and thus that lesbian couples opting 
for them would just be embarking on a very expensive vanity 
project. Explaining in detail why these claims, which John 
Appleby46 has named the ‘qualitative claim’ and the ‘quantitative 
claim’, are problematic for arguing that MRTs cannot establish 
parenthood would require much more space than we have avail-
able here.47 What we can state is that, following our previous 
section on how MRTs affect numerical identity, in the case of 
a lesbian couple both mothers would be parents under a causal 
account of parenthood, at least. They would be so because: ‘any 
[free] action that reasonably foreseeably results in the birth of a 
child generates responsibilities for that child’.48 And in this case, 
their free action of seeking MRTs, and the subsequent assisted 
reproductive steps, reasonably foreseeably results in the birth of 
a child.
rEproduCTIvE frEEdoM And TrEATIng lIkE CAsEs AlIkE
The possible use of MRTs as a reproductive option by lesbian 
couples has already been mentioned in the bioethics literature 
by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Françoise Baylis, Palacios 
et al, Rebecca Dimond, Ishii and Segers et al.18 49–54 Further-
more, from a legal point of view, Danielle Griffiths has explored 
how UK regulations on MRTs reproduces the heteronormative 
genetic family.55
However, in such literature, this possible application of MRTs 
is typically mentioned only in passing. A notable exception is 
Françoise Baylis. In her article ‘The ethics of creating children 
with three genetic parents’ she lists this possible use of MRTs 
under the heading ‘Harms to society’. She asserts:
While the initial goal of mitochondrial replacement technology is 
‘therapeutic’ insofar as it aims to avoid the birth of a child with 
mitochondrial disease, this technology could be used without 
therapeutic intent. For example, it could be used to pursue non-
therapeutic reproductive goals—imagine, a lesbian couple where 
significant new option. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for 
bringing this point to our attention.
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both partners wanted a genetic link to the children they intend to 
parent.18
Why the use of MRTs by lesbian couples would be harmful 
to society remains unclear in her article. With some exercise of 
imagination, and assuming that she in fact believes so, it seems 
that such harm stems from the fact that this use of MRTs would 
not be ‘therapeutic’, understanding therapeutic in the sense 
that ‘it aims to avoid the birth of a child with mitochondrial 
disease’.18 Non-therapeutic uses of technologies have been 
frequently condemned by bioethics scholars because they may 
corrupt values that we cherish2; they may damage our rela-
tionships among members of a society of equals1 and they may 
be instances of eugenics.56 However, despite Baylis’ concerns, 
morality demands treating like cases alike: if we accept that 
the use of MRTs by women at risk of transmitting an mtDNA 
disease neither harms society because a child without a mito-
chondrial disease would be created nor spares any individual 
from suffering, then we have to accept that the use of MRTs by 
lesbian couples does not harm society, because a child without 
a mitochondrial disease would be created, nor spares any indi-
vidual from suffering. It is true that both types of uses could be 
considered ‘eugenic’, rather than ‘therapeutic’, in the sense that 
they aim to bring a particular kind of individual into existence: 
healthy people who are genetically related to their parents. It is 
for the above-mentioned reasons that we find Baylis’ position 
wanting. All the more so, denying access to MRTs to lesbian 
couples is ethically unjustifiable in as much as it curtails the 
enjoyment of certain freedoms to a certain group without good 
reason, while allowing others to enjoy the very same freedoms. 
Those who want to prohibit the use of MRTs by lesbian couples 
need to present an argument for showing that them obtaining 
access to this technology is unethical, an argument that so far 
no one has successfully presented.xi
gEnETIC rElATEdnEss And MrTs
Let us take stock of what we have argued thus far. We have 
presented some arguments against the view that MRTs are ther-
apeutic technologies and hence concluded that concerns for the 
welfare of the future child cannot ground their moral accept-
ability nor restrict their use. We have then focused on the other 
reason that may morally justify offering MRTs, namely the 
reproductive freedom of prospective parents. We have argued, 
contra the position of those who want to restrict use of MRTs 
only to women at risk of transmitting mtDNA diseases, that 
morality demands treating like cases alike; and we maintain that 
a concern for equality would deem immoral a restriction on the 
use of MRTs based on one’s belonging to a group with certain 
sexual preferences. In this final section, we consider a potential 
objection to our argument: namely that the desire for genetic 
relatedness is not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian 
couples to access MRTs.
xi At this point, someone might claim that the possibility of mito-nu-
clear incompatibility speaks against the use of MRTs by lesbian couples. 
We can reply to this challenge in the following way: first, there can be 
lesbian couples where both women belong to the same haplogroup, and 
thus even if such interaction-worries materialise for them, they would 
not be a problem. Second, at this point in time, as the HFEA report 
mentions, such putative problems are theoretical, and even if they were 
to materialise lesbian couples should still have the option of resorting 
to MRTs (unless the created lives were wrongful ones). This position is 
not a radical one, but just the same as that which postulates that couples 
should be able to resort to assisted reproduction even when they know 
that their children might be at an elevated risk of having a disability.
One of the criticisms against MRTs, and against other repro-
ductive technologies, is that their sole benefit is to allow parents 
to have a genetic tie to their offspring, which is considered a 
morally dubious end.57 In this section, we refer to this as the 
genetic-relatedness objection (GRO) to MRTs. Underlying 
the GRO are two distinct types of concerns, one inspired by 
deontological concerns and the other inspired by consequen-
tialist concerns. Deontological concerns (GRO-d) centre on 
the morally dubious character of those seeking genetic related-
ness. This desire is suspect, critics argue, because it expresses a 
non-virtuous parenting attitude, one that aims at having partic-
ular kinds of children, which is considered by critics ‘a wish and 
not a need’.2 18 We do not explore further the GRO-d, as others 
have done so.58 Other concerns underlying the GRO are conse-
quentialist in nature (GRO-c). GRO-c focuses on the negative 
consequences which allowing prospective parents to use MRTs 
(and other ARTs) may generate. The negative consequences 
identified by the critics include: concerns for the resources 
needed to develop new technologies and how these resources 
may be employed for other more pressing medical needs18 57; 
the reinforcement of ideas on the importance of genetic kinship 
for family-making and on the role of genetics more generally 
to determine our identities57 59; the medicalisation of a social 
preference57 59 and the reinforcement of the two-parent (hetero-
sexual) genetically based model of the family (ie, bionormative 
conception of the family).19
At first sight, the initial type of GRO-c concerns, those hinging 
on the scarcity of available resources, seems to be legitimate. 
In practical terms, what this concern means is that, when we 
argue about the moral permissibility of MRTs, we have to factor 
in the costs of satisfying this preference, even if it is a strongly 
held one, against other medical opportunity costs, for example 
satisfying the basic medical needs of others. According to Baylis, 
once faced with this choice we have to reach the conclusion that 
research and clinical practice on MRTs are immoral. They are 
immoral given that they use scarce medical resources that could 
be better used elsewhere, because, as noted by Rulli and others, 
the development of MRTs requires(-ed) the use of vast resources 
both in terms of budget and personnel.57 One way to respond to 
this objection is to note that even if we grant Rulli’s and Baylis’ 
point regarding the use of scarce medical resources, from this 
fact it does not inherently follow that the use of medical scarce 
resources for MRTs is immoral. This is because in order to make 
such a claim, we need to prove that when compared against all 
other medical research that is being carried out the use of scarce 
medical resources for MRTs is unwarranted.60 Our concern here 
is not to examine the ethical case in favour of or against MRTs 
nor to provide an account of the ethical issues surrounding these 
techniques, but rather to stress the need to extend the existing 
criteria of access to these techniques to lesbian couples. Further-
more, concerns related to the necessary clinical research to 
develop MRTs do not apply in the case of lesbian couples, as 
these techniques are already in place; and in fact the use of MRTs 
by lesbian couples, and possibly by other non-mtDNA infertile 
couples, should be factored in when considering the overall 
offsetting of the costs of this research.
Last, we consider GRO-c concerns related to the reinforcement 
of genetic deterministic ideas about the importance of genetic relat-
edness for family-making and the reinforcement of the bionorma-
tive family. Many women and couples have a strong preference for 
having genetically related children.xii61 This is true for both women 
xii One may dispute, as previously stated, that MRTs allow couples at 
risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease and lesbian couples to achieve 
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with mtDNA diseases and lesbian couples, and we contend that in 
a liberal society allowing only heterosexual couples to enjoy the 
satisfaction of their wish, regardless of its philosophical validity, 
is problematic from the point of view of equality. This is akin to 
only allowing certain ethnic groups to access assisted reproductive 
technologies, for example.
In addition, gay and lesbian couples’ reproductive choices are 
already limited: depending on the countries’ regulations, these 
couples are often ineligible for third-party reproduction and for 
adoption. Preventing them from using an already existing tech-
nology due to consequentialist concerns related to the reinforce-
ment of genetic determinist ideas on the value of genetic relatedness 
seems to us akin to further restricting their already limited agency 
with respect to reproductive options.xiii Hence, even though it 
is true that we should be attentive to the fact that MRTs could 
contribute to increasing the value attributed to genetic related-
ness, to the detriment of other forms of family-making, it must be 
said that it would be morally problematic to just focus on lesbian 
couples and their wishes and choices thereof. In other words, we 
believe that it is compatible to hold the view that reproductive 
technologies such as MRTs might have undesirable consequences 
such as the ones described by the critics of these technologies, and 
the view that genetic relatedness seems to be an important good 
whose enjoyment should not be restricted on an arbitrary basis.
Regarding GRO-c concerns for the preservation of the bionor-
mative family, it must be noted that in the case of MRTs being 
used by lesbian couples, this charge does not apply. The use of 
MRTs by lesbian couples in fact defies the current dominion of the 
bionormative family in that it challenges the folk assumption about 
the correct type and amount of shared genes that are necessary 
for establishing a parental genetic link—50% of the nuclear genes 
from the father and 50% of the nuclear genes from the mother.xiv47 
Specifically, what it is asserted here is that 1% of an mtDNA 
genetic connection suffices for establishing genetic parenthood.xv 
Even more so, regulating MRTs so as to include lesbian couples 
the same end, namely to have genetically related children. While for 
the first group of couples MRTs allow them to have children whose 
genetic make-up contains genetic information from both nuclei of the 
parents, for lesbian couples the situation is different as one party of the 
couple would provide the nuclear DNA and the other would provide 
the mitochondrial DNA. The sociological question of whether contrib-
uting with ‘merely’ the mtDNA would be sufficient for lesbian couples 
to regard the children born thanks to the aid of MRTs as their own is yet 
to be answered. However, we maintain that the legislature should not a 
priori rule against this, based on the idea that mtDNA contributes less to 
genetic kinship than nuclear DNA.
xiii From The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Dona-
tion) Regulations 2015, it is not at all clear if in UK MRTs can only be 
accessed by heterosexual couples, or if lesbian couples could access them 
if one of the intending genetic parents is at risk of passing on a serious 
form of mtDNA disease.
xiv It must be noted that in the reproductive cloning debate, some authors 
already acknowledge the possibility of becoming a genetic parent 
through mtDNA. Mary Mahowald, for example, asserted that ‘through 
use of one woman’s nuclear DNA and another woman’s enucleated 
egg, a lesbian couple may have a child who is biologically related to 
both without requiring sperm donation’ and that ‘the ovum in which 
that parent’s DNA is inserted represents a significant environmental 
influence on development, and the mitochondrial DNA adds a genetic 
component to the environment of the nuclear DNA’.72 Others who have 
commented on this issue are Jean Chambers, Timothy Murphy and 
Carson Strong.73–76
xv It must be noted that this claim aims at subverting the folk western 
conception of genetic parenthood, and that it is not a claim regarding the 
metaphysics of reproduction. For an account of why MRT-conceived 
children do have three genetic parents, see Monika Piotrowska’s Is 
‘Assisted Reproduction’ Reproduction?.77
would expand the models of state-recognised genetic relatedness 
and challenge the existing order and, as seen by Griffiths, not 
doing so would be ‘an example of how science and regulation seek 
to expand models of traditional relatedness in a way that does not 
challenge the (bionormative) existing order’.55
ConClusIon
In this paper, we have challenged the view that MRTs are a therapy 
for mitochondrial diseases, and that these techniques can be consid-
ered harmful to children. We have argued that the rationale for 
offering these techniques must lie somewhere else, namely within 
concerns for the reproductive freedom of prospective parents. 
Shifting the focus of the moral debate on MRTs from concerns for 
the welfare of the children to other moral justifications for offering 
MRTs allows for the emergence of other questions that require 
moral consideration. In particular, it allows us to consider how 
an unduly restrictive approach to accessing MRTs to a particular 
group requires arguments that have not been presented thus far. 
We do not want to defend here the wish for genetic kinship as 
an absolute good that trumps other considerations and nor do we 
believe that reinforcing a family-making process that includes a 
genetic element is without costs. However, we remain convinced 
that these considerations cannot be employed solely to bar access 
to MRTs by lesbian couples, a group with an already limited range 
of reproductive options, as this would be immoral from an equality 
standpoint.
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